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By STANISLAV LUNEV
Former Colonel, GRU
Aleksander Lebed's appointment, two days after the 16 June first round of presidential 
elections, to the positions of National Security Advisor to President Yel'tsin and 
secretary of the Security Council was not entirely unexpected. The president's 
statements in the closing weeks of the campaign, hinting that he would soon name his 
successor, clearly referred to the retired two-star paratrooper general who, thanks to his 
electoral promises to restore order, had become a very popular figure as early as last 
year.
Some questions arose: Where did a retired general who had quarreled with the 
leadership of the KRO (Congress of Russian Communities), the electoral bloc which 
had supported him in the 1995 Duma elections, obtain the huge amount of funding 
necessary to participate vigorously in the presidential elections? The answer to this 
puzzle came later, when a Russian journalist revealed that Lebed' received support from 
Gennadi Burbulis, who was handling very delicate tasks on behalf of the Kremlin 
leadership, and Anatoli Chubais, who moved from his position as Deputy Prime Minister 
to become campaign manager for President Yel'tsin.
According to press reports, "Aleksander Lebed' was given everything he needed to 
organize a full-fledged campaign: structures for campaigning in the provinces, cash 
(according to some estimates, Lebed' received up to $20 million), television air time, 
and the support of the local authorities in arranging tours around the country. The 
ambitious general did not reject the assistance, understanding fairly well that he would 
have to pay off the 'debt'."(1)
1
Even before the first round of the elections, Yel'tsin offered to appoint him secretary of 
the Security Council in order to forestall an alliance between Lebed' and the 
communists. A little later, the post of National Security Advisor, with wide authority over 
the power ministries, was added to sweeten the offer. "Moreover, a hint was made to the 
effect that Lebed' would become vice-president."(2) The general agreed to accept the 
positions and, after the first round of the elections, declared his full support for the 
president.
If this account is accurate, then the image of Lebed' as a "disinterested, 
uncompromising and devoted servant of the Fatherland" created by government 
propaganda does more than ring false, but rather demonstrates the opposite. The 
discrepancy between the political image and the general's actions became evident soon 
after he assumed his duties.
Lebed' at the Helm of the Security Council
As the Russian journal Novoe vremya reported, Aleksander Lebed' reduced the Security 
Council's personnel from 400 to 183 persons. Among those dismissed were two of the 
three senior deputies. Reportedly, the remaining deputy, General Valeri Manilov, was 
the only one to "prostrate himself at the new chief's feet," as he had done with his 
previous bosses, faithfully serving (in successive order) Dmitri Yazov, Yevgeni 
Shaposhnikov, and Oleg Lobov. "Manilov offered Lebed' the necessary documentation 
on Security Council activities, while the others tried to destroy as much documentation 
as was possible."(3)
Correspondingly, Lebed' moved quickly to install his own people into what became his 
organ. One of them, an officer from the Directorate for Military Policy of the Defense 
Ministry, Colonel Vladimir Denisov, had already distinguished himself by compromising 
General Gromov. According to knowledgeable sources, it was not without Denisov's 
assistance that Lebed' was able to cut down a rival --Gromov--with a single phrase at a 
press conference: "'He is a good general but has sold himself cheaply.' This was 
2
sufficient for President Yel'tsin to cross off Gromov's name from the list of candidates for 
the post of Defense Minister."(4)
Commenting on the many dismissals Lebed' has organized, Novoe vremya points out 
that "having accepted Yel'tsin's invitation to join his team, he also agreed to become part 
of a circle of people who had grown accustomed to having their peace and to playing by 
their rules. However, it is evident that Lebed' follows only his own rules. He has 
challenged a clan of persons who have positioned themselves well within the Kremlin's 
shadow. This sort of thing is not easily forgiven. In this set of circumstances, a cold 
calculating realist can forecast Lebed's possible removal, since in his short tenure he 
has already managed to cross too many people who only recently were quite 
powerful."(5)
These forecasts were confirmed as early as three weeks after the election. Whereas 
Yel'tsin had promised Lebed' that the Security Council could become something of a 
super ministry (which would direct the activities of the Defense Ministry and the General 
Staff, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Security Service, the Border Guards 
and other security services that are successors to the KGB), in fact, the current Security  
Council no longer has such potential. The Security Council will have to share its 
functions and powers with a new body within the presidential administration, the 
Defense Council, which was created in accordance with a presidential edict of July 25.
(6) The new council has the president at its head and Victor Chernomyrdin as his 
deputy. Yuri Baturin, who in June was removed from the post of Yel'tsin's National 
Security Adviser to make room for Lebed' and hence must feel little sympathy for the 
general, was appointed secretary of the Defense Council.
Lebed', for his part, became merely a member of the Defense Council on a par with the 
other power ministers, who were supposed to become his subordinates. Other 
members of the new council--Anatoli Chubais, Yevgeni Velihov, and Yevgeni Yasin--hold 
views diametrically opposed to the general's. Now Lebed' may be expected to bring 
proposals for discussion at the Defense Council, which could have the last word. Thus 
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Yel'tsin fulfilled his promises to Lebed', but minimized his capabilities by creating the 
new council, in effect casting doubt on Lebed's ability to implement his plans.
These circumstances illuminate Lebed's hysterical reaction to the changes in the 
Kremlin leadership. In an interview with the Washington Times, he expressed concern 
that he might be removed from power and physically eliminated; he told the Financial 
Times that he could be blown up or shot and that his first priority in the current condition 
is to survive.(7) This adds another dimension to the portrait of the brave Russian ex-
general and politician.
It seems that Lebed's political star may begin to fade without ever having reached its full 
luster. Fifteen percent of the Russian electorate which voted for him, although poorly 
acquainted with him, still had high hopes. He had promised to ensure the personal 
safety of Russian citizens, to restore order in the country, to fight crime, to reform the 
military, and to end the war in Chechnya. However, beside clearing out the higher levels 
of the military leadership, which Lebed' described as "the beginning of the departure of 
the adventurists from the military," and making a serious attempt to tackle the war in 
Chechnya, at this point he is still trying to establish his authority.
Lebed's National Security Concept
Lebed's military and strategic thought has received considerably less attention in the 
western media.
The Security Council's new document on Russia's national security concept reflects 
views Lebed' expressed earlier. As he wrote in Segodnya, "the end of the Cold War" has 
not engendered a more peaceful world.(8) There are 73 hot spots on the planet, he 
says, which pose a threat to regional and international stability. Of those, 25 are 
experiencing wars or intense armed conflicts, in 25 cases rising military tensions have 
been observed, and the 23 remaining are regarded as areas of potential conflict. Most 
of these conflict areas are located on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The main 
sources of conflict are legal nihilism, aggressive nationalism, territorial issues, the 
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unresolved status of socio-economic development in certain CIS and RF areas, 
conflicting state interests, allegedly discriminatory laws on citizenship adopted by some 
CIS members, unresolved issues regarding the status of former Soviet property, the 
creation of unconstitutional armed formations, and lingering mutually conflicting 
economic and territorial claims among the NIS.
Lebed' emphasized that what he termed the "black process" of converting former Soviet 
property into private domains has created local lords whose main ambition consists of 
protecting their property from the claims of the central and local authorities and of 
securing whatever else can be obtained. Stability will not take hold until this "black 
process" is halted, and new legal norms governing property are institutionalized in all 
the CIS member states. This suggests that the threat of conflict close to Russia or on its 
borders remains an objective reality.
In listing the existing and potential conflicts close to Russian borders, the general took 
special note of the unresolved problems in the South, the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, 
and the Far East. In these areas the political conflicts are further complicated by ethnic 
and religious animosities as well as by issues of transferring property rights. He further 
believes that Tajikistan, Iran, and Pakistan are being drawn into the Afghan conflict to 
the detriment of Russian interests. There a bundle of contradictions is taking shape. 
Strategically, this poses a serious threat for Russia and Tajikistan, and, should that 
alliance fail, Uzbekistan and Muslim portions of Kazakhstan could follow, producing a 
massive hostile springboard close to Russia.
Nor should we forget, the general alleged, that "certain circles in Turkey" work to inspire 
tensions in the Transcaucasus and North Caucasus. The Islamicists who won in the last 
election, he claims, regard these territories as Turkey's sphere of influence, part of the 
great Turan that stretches from the Bosphorus to the Pacific Ocean.(9) This area 
includes communities of the Ural and Siberian Tatars, the Chuvash, and the Yakuts, as 
well as all of Central Asia. Moreover, having carefully analyzed events like the hostage 
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taking in Budennovsk, and Kizlyar, and the attack on the barge in Trab'zon, Lebed' 
alleges that Turkey's security services may have played a part in those affairs.
The general further believes that the next decade will not see a large-scale war since 
the parties lack the strength to start one, nor would this be in their interests. The "Cold 
War" is indeed over, but local conflicts remain. These have the potential of involving 
states or coalitions of states, and growing into large scale conflicts. For this reason local 
conflicts must be resolved rapidly at their source. This requires planning and executing 
special operations with the involvement of different departments, forces, and resources.
In regard to this, General Lebed' pointedly criticized plans for military reform announced 
long ago, stressing in particular the absence of implementation. For his part, Lebed' has 
not come forth with any new approach to the problem, commenting only that mobile 
forces must be created to deter, limit, and neutralize rapidly local conflicts, and that 
paratrooper forces should be retained until rapid reaction capabilities are in place.
Rodionov's Views on Military Reform
Igor Rodionov, the three-star general appointed Defense Minister in July at Lebed's 
suggestion, has been more specific on military and strategic issues. He told journalists 
that he does not perceive an external threat to Russia; instead, Russia's most 
dangerous threats come from within. (10) Russia must be saved from itself because, 
due to poorly arranged economic and governmental structures, it can disintegrate just 
like the USSR. Often the Kremlin leadership is entirely in the dark about decisions made 
by regional governors. If the country wishes to remain unified, it must have a single 
president and a single constitution.
For this reason, General Rodionov believes that military reform cannot be accomplished 
without country-wide implementation. Reform of the armed forces is a general concept; 
it requires the adaptation by all of the state's defense organs to new political, economic, 
social, and demographic conditions. Military reform was proclaimed, but never 
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implemented. Since nothing, save for some reductions in size, is being accomplished on 
a country-wide scale, military reform remains at a standstill.
The general notes that during past Soviet efforts to remain abreast with the US, the 
country built up its defenses, relying on vast quantities of weapons, strategic weapons 
in particular. As a result the economy was forced into a dead end and the population 
into poverty, all for the sake of the arms race. Today, as in the past, Russia tries to 
measure itself against the US, yet a new approach is needed, because today Russia 
lags behind the US by a considerable margin. Since it has lesser resources, it must 
have a different approach to defense, because defense above all else depends on the 
economy. It is no secret, Rodionov explains, that currently there is not a single regiment, 
never mind a division or anything larger, that can be ready for combat within two to 
three hours. For this reason, the practice of using the army for agricultural work must 
cease. The army can be smaller, but it must be more combat-capable.
As Rodionov sees it, Russia has such a large territory, vast borders, and complicated 
relations with its neighbors, that threats can arise from the West, the South and the 
East. Now all is calm in the East, but with the Russian population unwilling to live in and 
emigrating from remote areas, who can tell what it will be like in ten years? Who is 
going to fill that space? Neighboring states and their populations, of course. In the West, 
there is NATO, which not only continues to exist but expects to expand, moving closer 
to Russia's borders. To the South there is the Muslim world. Russia, therefore, is 
vulnerable from all sides. Naturally, following this logic, if with time threats can arise 
from all sides, then it is necessary to have powerful forces in all directions, but this 
hardly solves the problem since no economy can withstand this demand.
General Rodionov emphasizes that he is a supporter of agreements which expand the 
partnership with NATO, provide for exchanges, and facilitate greater trust and lower 
tensions. These contacts should be supported and broadened. However, he states, "I 
am an opponent of those policies by which we strive to uphold Russian prestige, 
inherited from the great USSR, or worse, when in trying to fulfill our illusions of grandeur 
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we seek to prove that no problem anywhere in the world can be resolved without 
Russian involvement. These policies must be revised; they call for huge expenditures 
and give no return, except of course for demagoguery and false prestige."
Furthermore, the general states that, since Russia established presidential rule with the 
cabinet and parliament in a lesser role, he has supported appointing a civilian Defense 
Minister, duly trained "in operations and strategy, who has at least a three-month course 
in [the Academy of the General Staff]."
Of course Russia, like any country, needs a defense and security system, but it must 
correspond to the state's capabilities. In this light, General Rodionov's sober views on 
military reform take into account the very serious economic, political, and social crisis 
Russia is experiencing. Whether he actually can restructure Russia's armed forces to 
correspond to Russia's current circumstances is another matter. The military-political 
ambitions of the Kremlin's current leadership, its yearning to dominate not only regions 
on the perimeter of the former Soviet Union, but places far removed from it, will 
inevitably alter Rodionov's plans.
How this general, who is highly esteemed in the armed forces, responds to these 
corrections will determine not only Russia's defense and security system, but also the 
global military-strategic environment for the end of this century and the beginning of the 
next. Unless, of course, the walls of the ancient Kremlin witness another cycle of 
extraordinary events.
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